Overview

Request 1099810 accepted

- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.

In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction.

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Request History
Simon Lees's avatar

simotek created request

- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.

In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction.


Marcus Meissner's avatar

msmeissn accepted request

ok

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