File 62ecfc08-VMX-use-IST-RSB-protection.patch of Package xen.32204

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File 62ecfc08-VMX-use-IST-RSB-protection.patch of Package xen.32204

# Commit e570e8d520ab542d8d35666b95cb3a0125b7b110
# Date 2022-08-05 12:16:24 +0100
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/spec-ctrl: Use IST RSB protection for !SVM systems

There is a corner case where a VT-x guest which manages to reliably trigger
non-fatal #MC's could evade the rogue RSB speculation protections that were
supposed to be in place.

This is a lack of defence in depth; Xen does not architecturally execute more
RET than CALL instructions, so an attacker would have to locate a different
gadget (e.g. SpectreRSB) first to execute a transient path of excess RET
instructions.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -1622,8 +1622,24 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations
      * mappings.
      */
     if ( opt_rsb_hvm )
+    {
         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM);
 
+        /*
+         * For SVM, Xen's RSB safety actions are performed before STGI, so
+         * behave atomically with respect to IST sources.
+         *
+         * For VT-x, NMIs are atomic with VMExit (the NMI gets queued but not
+         * delivered) whereas other IST sources are not atomic.  Specifically,
+         * #MC can hit ahead the RSB safety action in the vmexit path.
+         *
+         * Therefore, it is necessary for the IST logic to protect Xen against
+         * possible rogue RSB speculation.
+         */
+        if ( !cpu_has_svm )
+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_rsb;
+    }
+
     srso_calculations(hw_smt_enabled);
 
     ibpb_calculations();

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File 62ecfc08-VMX-use-IST-RSB-protection.patch of Package xen.32204

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