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xen.30827
xsa435-0-45.patch
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File xsa435-0-45.patch of Package xen.30827
From 36525a964fb629d0bd26e5a1c42de467af7a42a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 20:31:22 +0100 Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Fix up the RSBA/RRSBA bits as appropriate In order to level a VM safely for migration, the toolstack needs to know the RSBA/RRSBA properties of the CPU, whether or not they happen to be enumerated. See the code comment for details. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Also minimal fragments from: c/s 0bf9efb9ee4c ("xen/arm: Sanitize cpuinfo ID registers fields") to introduce TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC. --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -587,7 +587,10 @@ static bool __init check_smt_enabled(voi return false; } -/* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */ +/* + * Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. Fix up the + * RSBA/RRSBA bits as necessary. + */ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void) { unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(ucode_cpu_info).cpu_sig.rev; @@ -601,15 +604,93 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculation return false; /* - * RSBA may be set by a hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a - * processor which isn't retpoline-safe. + * The meaning of the RSBA and RRSBA bits have evolved over time. The + * agreed upon meaning at the time of writing (May 2023) is thus: * + * - RSBA (RSB Alternative) means that an RSB may fall back to an + * alternative predictor on underflow. Skylake uarch and later all have + * this property. Broadwell too, when running microcode versions prior + * to Jan 2018. + * + * - All eIBRS-capable processors suffer RSBA, but eIBRS also introduces + * tagging of predictions with the mode in which they were learned. So + * when eIBRS is active, RSBA becomes RRSBA (Restricted RSBA). + * + * - CPUs are not expected to enumerate both RSBA and RRSBA. + * + * Some parts (Broadwell) are not expected to ever enumerate this + * behaviour directly. Other parts have differing enumeration with + * microcode version. Fix up Xen's idea, so we can advertise them safely + * to guests, and so toolstacks can level a VM safety for migration. + * + * The following states exist: + * + * | | RSBA | EIBRS | RRSBA | Notes | Action (in principle) | + * |---+------+-------+-------+--------------------+-----------------------| + * | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | OK (older parts) | Maybe +RSBA | + * | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Broken | (+RSBA, -RRSBA) | + * | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | OK (pre-Aug ucode) | +RRSBA | + * | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | OK | | + * | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | OK | | + * | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Broken | (-RRSBA) | + * | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Broken | (-RSBA, +RRSBA) | + * | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Broken | (-RSBA) | + * + * However, we don't need perfect adherence to the spec. We only need + * RSBA || RRSBA to indicate "alternative predictors potentially in use". + * Rows 1 & 3 are fixed up by later logic, as they're known configurations + * which exist in the world. + * + * Complain loudly at the broken cases. They're safe for Xen to use (so we + * don't attempt to correct), and may or may not exist in reality, but if + * we ever encounter them in practice, something is wrong and needs + * further investigation. + */ + if ( cpu_has_eibrs ? cpu_has_rsba /* Rows 7, 8 */ + : cpu_has_rrsba /* Rows 2, 6 */ ) + { + printk(XENLOG_ERR + "FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: RSBA %u, EIBRS %u, RRSBA %u\n", + boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model, + boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, ucode_rev, + cpu_has_rsba, cpu_has_eibrs, cpu_has_rrsba); + add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC); + } + + /* * Processors offering Enhanced IBRS are not guarenteed to be * repoline-safe. */ - if ( cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_eibrs ) + if ( cpu_has_eibrs ) + { + /* + * Prior to the August 2023 microcode, many eIBRS-capable parts did + * not enumerate RRSBA. + */ + if ( !cpu_has_rrsba ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA); + + return false; + } + + /* + * RSBA is explicitly enumerated in some cases, but may also be set by a + * hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a processor which isn't + * retpoline-safe. + */ + if ( cpu_has_rsba ) return false; + /* + * At this point, we've filtered all the legal RSBA || RRSBA cases (or the + * known non-ideal cases). If ARCH_CAPS is visible, trust the absence of + * RSBA || RRSBA. There's no known microcode which advertises ARCH_CAPS + * without RSBA or EIBRS, and if we're virtualised we can't rely the model + * check anyway. + */ + if ( cpu_has_arch_caps ) + return true; + switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model ) { case 0x17: /* Penryn */ @@ -697,6 +778,15 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculation break; } + if ( !safe ) + { + /* + * Note: the eIBRS-capable parts are filtered out earlier, so the + * remainder here are the ones which suffer RSBA behaviour. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSBA); + } + return safe; } @@ -1108,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations has_spec_ctrl = (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)); - /* Determine if retpoline is safe on this CPU. */ + /* Determine if retpoline is safe on this CPU. Fix up RSBA/RRSBA enumerations. */ retpoline_safe = retpoline_calculations(); /* --- a/xen/common/kernel.c +++ b/xen/common/kernel.c @@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ unsigned int tainted; * 'E' - An error (e.g. a machine check exceptions) has been injected. * 'H' - HVM forced emulation prefix is permitted. * 'M' - Machine had a machine check experience. + * 'S' - Out of spec CPU (Incompatible features on one or more cores). * * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint(). */ @@ -348,11 +349,12 @@ char *print_tainted(char *str) { if ( tainted ) { - snprintf(str, TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN, "Tainted: %c%c%c%c", + snprintf(str, TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN, "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c", tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ', tainted & TAINT_SYNC_CONSOLE ? 'C' : ' ', tainted & TAINT_ERROR_INJECT ? 'E' : ' ', - tainted & TAINT_HVM_FEP ? 'H' : ' '); + tainted & TAINT_HVM_FEP ? 'H' : ' ', + tainted & TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC ? 'S' : ' '); } else { --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #define cpu_has_tsx_ctrl boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSX_CTRL) #define cpu_has_taa_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TAA_NO) #define cpu_has_fb_clear boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FB_CLEAR) +#define cpu_has_rrsba boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA) /* Synthesized. */ #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON) --- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ uint64_t muldiv64(uint64_t a, uint32_t b #define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK (1u << 1) #define TAINT_ERROR_INJECT (1u << 2) #define TAINT_HVM_FEP (1u << 3) +#define TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC (1u << 5) extern unsigned int tainted; #define TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN 20 extern char *print_tainted(char *str);
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