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xen.30332
xsa407-0g.patch
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File xsa407-0g.patch of Package xen.30332
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Knobs for STIBP and PSFD, and follow hardware STIBP hint STIBP and PSFD are slightly weird bits, because they're both implied by other bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. Add fine grain controls for them, and take the implications into account when setting IBRS/SSBD. Rearrange the IBPB text/variables/logic to keep all the MSR_SPEC_CTRL bits together, for consistency. However, AMD have a hardware hint CPUID bit recommending that STIBP be set unilaterally. This is advertised on Zen3, so follow the recommendation. Furthermore, in such cases, set STIBP behind the guest's back for now. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> (cherry picked from commit fef244b179c06fcdfa581f7d57fa6e578c49ff50) [Adjust for absence of INTEL_PSFD] --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -1952,8 +1952,8 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at run ### spec-ctrl (x86) > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>, -> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu, -> l1d-flush,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` +> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, +> eager-fpu,l1d-flush,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, @@ -2003,9 +2003,10 @@ On hardware supporting IBRS (Indirect Br If Xen is not using IBRS itself, functionality is still set up so IBRS can be virtualised for guests. -On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=` -option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch -prediction barriers on vcpu context switches. +On hardware supporting STIBP (Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors), the +`stibp=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. +By default, Xen will use STIBP when IBRS is in use (IBRS implies STIBP), and +when hardware hints recommend using it as a blanket setting. On hardware supporting SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable), the `ssbd=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. On AMD @@ -2013,6 +2014,15 @@ hardware, this is a global option applie guest use. On Intel hardware, the feature is virtualised for guests, independently of Xen's choice of setting. +On hardware supporting PSFD (Predictive Store Forwarding Disable), the `psfd=` +option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. By +default, Xen will not use PSFD. PSFD is implied by SSBD, and SSBD is off by +default. + +On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=` +option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch +prediction barriers on vcpu context switches. + On all hardware, the `eager-fpu=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen from using fully eager FPU context switches. This is currently implemented as a global control. By default, Xen will choose to use fully eager context --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ static enum ind_thunk { THUNK_LFENCE, THUNK_JMP, } opt_thunk __initdata = THUNK_DEFAULT; + static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1; +int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1; +bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd; +int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true; -bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd = false; int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1; int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1; @@ -173,12 +177,20 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const else rc = -EINVAL; } + + /* Bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibrs", s, ss)) >= 0 ) opt_ibrs = val; - else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) - opt_ibpb = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("stibp", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_stibp = val; else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 ) opt_ssbd = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("psfd", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_psfd = val; + + /* Misc settings. */ + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_ibpb = val; else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 ) opt_eager_fpu = val; else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 ) @@ -372,7 +384,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum in "\n"); /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */ - printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s\n", + printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s\n", thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" : thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" : @@ -386,6 +398,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum in (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ? "" : (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-", + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) && + (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_PSFD) ? " PSFD+" : " PSFD-", !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? "" : (opt_tsx & 1) ? " TSX+" : " TSX-", !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL) ? "" : @@ -1030,14 +1044,48 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM); } - /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ + /* Figure out default_xen_spec_ctrl. */ if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) + { + /* IBRS implies STIBP. */ + if ( opt_stibp == -1 ) + opt_stibp = 1; + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + } + + /* + * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set. Otherwise, leave it + * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware + * where it was retrofitted in microcode. + */ + if ( opt_stibp == -1 ) + opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS); + + if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) ) + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */ if ( opt_ssbd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ) + { + /* SSBD implies PSFD */ + if ( opt_psfd == -1 ) + opt_psfd = 1; + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; + } + + /* + * Don't use PSFD by default. AMD designed the predictor to + * auto-clear on privilege change. PSFD is implied by SSBD, which is + * off by default. + */ + if ( opt_psfd == -1 ) + opt_psfd = 0; + + if ( opt_psfd && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) ) + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_PSFD; /* * PV guests can poison the RSB to any virtual address from which
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