File CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-ge... of Package virt-v2v.25778

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File CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch of Package virt-v2v.25778

Subject: options: fix buffer overflow in get_keys() [CVE-2022-2211]
From: Laszlo Ersek lersek@redhat.com Tue Jun 28 13:49:04 2022 +0200
Date: Wed Jun 29 15:17:17 2022 +0200:
Git: 35467027f657de76aca34b48a6f23e9608b23a57

When calculating the greatest possible number of matching keys in
get_keys(), the current expression

MIN (1, ks->nr_keys)

is wrong -- it will return at most 1.

If all "nr_keys" keys match however, then we require "nr_keys" non-NULL
entries in the result array; in other words, we need

MAX (1, ks->nr_keys)

(The comment just above the expression is correct; the code is wrong.)

This buffer overflow is easiest to trigger in those guestfs tools that
parse the "--key" option in C; that is, with "OPTION_key". For example,
the command

$ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda2:key:%g' 200) -d DOMAIN /no-such-file

which passes 200 (different) passphrases for the LUKS-encrypted block
device "/dev/sda2", crashes with a SIGSEGV.

A slightly better reproducer from Rich Jones is the following, since it
doesn't require an encrypted guest disk image:

$ echo TEST | guestfish --keys-from-stdin -N part luks-format /dev/sda1 0
$ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda1:key:%g' 200) -a test1.img /no-such-file
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
$ rm test1.img

(

The buffer overflow is possible to trigger in OCaml-language tools as
  well; that is, those that call "create_standard_options" with
  ~key_opts:true.

Triggering the problem that way is less trivial. The reason is that when
  the OCaml tools parse the "--key" options, they de-duplicate the options
  first, based on the device identifier.

Thus, in theory, this de-duplication masks the issue, as (one would
  think) only one "--key" option could belong to a single device, and
  therefore the buffer overflow would not be triggered in practice.

This is not the case however: the de-duplication does not collapse keys
  that are provided for the same device, but use different identifier
  types (such as pathname of device node versus LUKS UUID) -- in that
  situation, two entries in the keystore will match the device, and the
  terminating NULL entry will not be present once get_keys() returns. In
  this scenario, we don't have an out-of-bounds write, but an
  out-of-bounds read, in decrypt_mountables() [options/decrypt.c].

There is *yet another* bug in get_keys() though that undoes the above
  "masking". The "uuid" parameter of get_keys() may be NULL (for example
  when the device to decrypt uses BitLocker and not LUKS). When this
  happens, get_keys() adds all keys in the keystore to the result array.
  Therefore, the out-of-bounds write is easy to trigger with
  OCaml-language tools as well, as long as we attempt to decrypt a
  BitLocker (not LUKS) device, and we pass the "--key" options with
  different device identifiers.

Subsequent patches in this series fix all of the above; this patch fixes
  the security bug.

)

Rather than replacing MIN with MAX, open-code the comparison, as we first
set "len" to 1 anyway.

While at it, rework the NULL-termination such that the (len+1) addition
not go unchecked.

Fixes: c10c8baedb88e7c2988a01b70fc5f81fa8e4885c
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1809453
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100862
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220628114915.5030-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>

--- a/common/options/keys.c
+++ b/common/options/keys.c
@@ -128,17 +128,23 @@ read_first_line_from_file (const char *f
 char **
 get_keys (struct key_store *ks, const char *device, const char *uuid)
 {
-  size_t i, j, len;
+  size_t i, j, nmemb;
   char **r;
   char *s;
 
   /* We know the returned list must have at least one element and not
    * more than ks->nr_keys.
    */
-  len = 1;
-  if (ks)
-    len = MIN (1, ks->nr_keys);
-  r = calloc (len+1, sizeof (char *));
+  nmemb = 1;
+  if (ks && ks->nr_keys > nmemb)
+    nmemb = ks->nr_keys;
+
+  /* make room for the terminating NULL */
+  if (nmemb == (size_t)-1)
+    error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("size_t overflow"));
+  nmemb++;
+
+  r = calloc (nmemb, sizeof (char *));
   if (r == NULL)
     error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "calloc");

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File CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch of Package virt-v2v.25778

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