File cve-2021-32675.patch of Package redis.28077

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File cve-2021-32675.patch of Package redis.28077

From 5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2021 17:31:39 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of
 memory (CVE-2021-32675)

This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
---
 src/networking.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 src/server.c        |  9 ++-------
 src/server.h        |  1 +
 tests/unit/auth.tcl | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/networking.c b/src/networking.c
index a61678dab2bb..b02397c96f49 100644
--- a/src/networking.c
+++ b/src/networking.c
@@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ void linkClient(client *c) {
     raxInsert(server.clients_index,(unsigned char*)&id,sizeof(id),c,NULL);
 }
 
+int authRequired(client *c) {
+    /* Check if the user is authenticated. This check is skipped in case
+     * the default user is flagged as "nopass" and is active. */
+    int auth_required = (!(DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_NOPASS) ||
+                          (DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_DISABLED)) &&
+                        !c->authenticated;
+    return auth_required;
+}
+
 client *createClient(connection *conn) {
     client *c = zmalloc(sizeof(client));
 
@@ -1744,6 +1753,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
             addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid multibulk length");
             setProtocolError("invalid mbulk count",c);
             return C_ERR;
+        } else if (ll > 10 && authRequired(c)) {
+            addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated multibulk length");
+            setProtocolError("unauth mbulk count", c);
+            return C_ERR;
         }
 
         c->qb_pos = (newline-c->querybuf)+2;
@@ -1791,6 +1804,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
                 addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid bulk length");
                 setProtocolError("invalid bulk length",c);
                 return C_ERR;
+            } else if (ll > 16384 && authRequired(c)) {
+                addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated bulk length");
+                setProtocolError("unauth bulk length", c);
+                return C_ERR;
             }
 
             c->qb_pos = newline-c->querybuf+2;
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index 93148f8e3ed3..c8768b1824bc 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -3590,13 +3590,8 @@ int processCommand(client *c) {
     int is_denyloading_command = !(c->cmd->flags & CMD_LOADING) ||
                                  (c->cmd->proc == execCommand && (c->mstate.cmd_inv_flags & CMD_LOADING));
 
-    /* Check if the user is authenticated. This check is skipped in case
-     * the default user is flagged as "nopass" and is active. */
-    int auth_required = (!(DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_NOPASS) ||
-                          (DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_DISABLED)) &&
-                        !c->authenticated;
-    if (auth_required) {
-        /* AUTH and HELLO and no auth modules are valid even in
+    if (authRequired(c)) {
+        /* AUTH and HELLO and no auth commands are valid even in
          * non-authenticated state. */
         if (!(c->cmd->flags & CMD_NO_AUTH)) {
             rejectCommand(c,shared.noautherr);
diff --git a/src/server.h b/src/server.h
index a16f28858296..530355421a8d 100644
--- a/src/server.h
+++ b/src/server.h
@@ -1743,6 +1743,7 @@ void protectClient(client *c);
 void unprotectClient(client *c);
 void initThreadedIO(void);
 client *lookupClientByID(uint64_t id);
+int authRequired(client *c);
 
 #ifdef __GNUC__
 void addReplyErrorFormat(client *c, const char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/tests/unit/auth.tcl b/tests/unit/auth.tcl
index 9080d4bf7e95..530ca7c8d912 100644
--- a/tests/unit/auth.tcl
+++ b/tests/unit/auth.tcl
@@ -24,4 +24,20 @@ start_server {tags {"auth"} overrides {requirepass foobar}} {
         r set foo 100
         r incr foo
     } {101}
+
+    test {For unauthenticated clients multibulk and bulk length are limited} {
+        set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0 $::tls]
+        $rr write "*100\r\n"
+        $rr flush
+        catch {[$rr read]} e
+        assert_match {*unauthenticated multibulk length*} $e
+        $rr close
+
+        set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0 $::tls]
+        $rr write "*1\r\n\$100000000\r\n"
+        $rr flush
+        catch {[$rr read]} e
+        assert_match {*unauthenticated bulk length*} $e
+        $rr close
+    }
 }

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File cve-2021-32675.patch of Package redis.28077

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