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SUSE:SLE-15-SP2:GA
flatpak.25785
CVE-2021-41133.patch
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File CVE-2021-41133.patch of Package flatpak.25785
diff -urpN flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/flatpak-run.c flatpak-1.2.3/common/flatpak-run.c --- flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/flatpak-run.c 2022-08-30 16:26:11.937695714 -0500 +++ flatpak-1.2.3/common/flatpak-run.c 2022-08-31 12:51:10.549682079 -0500 @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include <dconf/dconf.h> #endif +#include "flatpak-syscalls-private.h" + #ifdef ENABLE_SECCOMP #include <seccomp.h> #endif @@ -2285,6 +2287,38 @@ static const uint32_t seccomp_x86_64_ext static const uint32_t seccomp_aarch64_extra_arches[] = { SCMP_ARCH_ARM, 0 }; #endif +/* + * @negative_errno: Result code as returned by libseccomp functions + * + * Translate a libseccomp error code into an error message. libseccomp + * mostly returns negative `errno` values such as `-ENOMEM`, but some + * standard `errno` values are used for non-standard purposes where their + * `strerror()` would be misleading. + * + * Returns: a string version of @negative_errno if possible + */ +static const char * +flatpak_seccomp_strerror (int negative_errno) +{ + g_return_val_if_fail (negative_errno < 0, "Non-negative error value from libseccomp?"); + g_return_val_if_fail (negative_errno > INT_MIN, "Out of range error value from libseccomp?"); + + switch (negative_errno) + { + case -EDOM: + return "Architecture specific failure"; + + case -EFAULT: + return "Internal libseccomp failure (unknown syscall?)"; + + case -ECANCELED: + return "System failure beyond the control of libseccomp"; + } + + /* e.g. -ENOMEM: the result of strerror() is good enough */ + return g_strerror (-negative_errno); +} + static inline void cleanup_seccomp (void *p) { @@ -2315,8 +2349,8 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, * can do, and we should support code portability between different * container tools. * - * This syscall blacklist is copied from linux-user-chroot, which was in turn - * clearly influenced by the Sandstorm.io blacklist. + * This syscall blocklist is copied from linux-user-chroot, which was in turn + * clearly influenced by the Sandstorm.io blocklist. * * If you make any changes here, I suggest sending the changes along * to other sandbox maintainers. Using the libseccomp list is also @@ -2324,7 +2358,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, * https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/libseccomp * * A non-exhaustive list of links to container tooling that might - * want to share this blacklist: + * want to share this blocklist: * * https://github.com/sandstorm-io/sandstorm * in src/sandstorm/supervisor.c++ @@ -2333,66 +2367,101 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, * https://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot * in src/setup-seccomp.c * + * Other useful resources: + * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/HEAD/src/shared/seccomp-util.c + * https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/HEAD/profiles/seccomp/default.json + * **** END NOTE ON CODE SHARING */ struct { int scall; + int errnum; struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg; - } syscall_blacklist[] = { + } syscall_blocklist[] = { /* Block dmesg */ - {SCMP_SYS (syslog)}, + {SCMP_SYS (syslog), EPERM}, /* Useless old syscall */ - {SCMP_SYS (uselib)}, + {SCMP_SYS (uselib), EPERM}, /* Don't allow disabling accounting */ - {SCMP_SYS (acct)}, + {SCMP_SYS (acct), EPERM}, /* 16-bit code is unnecessary in the sandbox, and modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks. */ - {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt)}, + {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt), EPERM}, /* Don't allow reading current quota use */ - {SCMP_SYS (quotactl)}, + {SCMP_SYS (quotactl), EPERM}, /* Don't allow access to the kernel keyring */ - {SCMP_SYS (add_key)}, - {SCMP_SYS (keyctl)}, - {SCMP_SYS (request_key)}, + {SCMP_SYS (add_key), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (keyctl), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (request_key), EPERM}, /* Scary VM/NUMA ops */ - {SCMP_SYS (move_pages)}, - {SCMP_SYS (mbind)}, - {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy)}, - {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy)}, - {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages)}, + {SCMP_SYS (move_pages), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (mbind), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages), EPERM}, /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */ - {SCMP_SYS (unshare)}, - {SCMP_SYS (mount)}, - {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root)}, - {SCMP_SYS (clone), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)}, + {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (setns), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (umount), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (umount2), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM}, + {SCMP_SYS (chroot), EPERM}, +#if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__) + /* Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack + * and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second */ + {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)}, +#else + /* Normally the flags come first */ + {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)}, +#endif /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */ - {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)}, + {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)}, + + /* seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether + * the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3(). + * Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone(). + * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) */ + {SCMP_SYS (clone3), ENOSYS}, + + /* New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no + * legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them + * rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous. + * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q) */ + {SCMP_SYS (open_tree), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (move_mount), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (fsopen), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (fsconfig), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (fsmount), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (fspick), ENOSYS}, + {SCMP_SYS (mount_setattr), ENOSYS}, }; struct { int scall; + int errnum; struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg; - } syscall_nondevel_blacklist[] = { + } syscall_nondevel_blocklist[] = { /* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside * the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. */ - {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open)}, + {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open), EPERM}, /* Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot */ - {SCMP_SYS (personality), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)}, - {SCMP_SYS (ptrace)} + {SCMP_SYS (personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)}, + {SCMP_SYS (ptrace), EPERM} }; - /* Blacklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */ + /* Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */ struct { int family; FlatpakRunFlags flags_mask; - } socket_family_whitelist[] = { + } socket_family_allowlist[] = { /* NOTE: Keep in numerical order */ { AF_UNSPEC, 0 }, { AF_LOCAL, 0 }, @@ -2447,7 +2516,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, couldn't continue running. */ r = seccomp_arch_add (seccomp, arch_id); if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) - return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add architecture to seccomp filter")); + return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add architecture to seccomp filter: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r)); if (multiarch && extra_arches != NULL) { @@ -2456,7 +2525,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, { r = seccomp_arch_add (seccomp, extra_arches[i]); if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) - return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add multiarch architecture to seccomp filter")); + return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to add multiarch architecture to seccomp filter: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r)); } } } @@ -2467,29 +2536,50 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, * leak system stuff or secrets from other apps. */ - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blacklist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blocklist); i++) { - int scall = syscall_blacklist[i].scall; - if (syscall_blacklist[i].arg) - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_blacklist[i].arg); + int scall = syscall_blocklist[i].scall; + int errnum = syscall_blocklist[i].errnum; + + g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE); + + if (syscall_blocklist[i].arg) + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_blocklist[i].arg); else - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0); - if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */) - return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall); + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0); + + /* EFAULT means "internal libseccomp error", but in practice we get + * this for syscall numbers added via flatpak-syscalls-private.h + * when trying to filter them on a non-native architecture, because + * libseccomp cannot map the syscall number to a name and back to a + * number for the non-native architecture. */ + if (r == -EFAULT) + flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?", + scall); + else if (r < 0) + return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d: %s"), scall, flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r)); } if (!devel) { - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blacklist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blocklist); i++) { - int scall = syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].scall; - if (syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg) - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg); + int scall = syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].scall; + int errnum = syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].errnum; + + g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE); + + if (syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg) + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blocklist[i].arg); else - r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0); + r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0); - if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */) - return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall); + /* See above for the meaning of EFAULT. */ + if (r == -EFAULT) + flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?", + scall); + else if (r < 0) + return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d: %s"), scall, flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r)); } } @@ -2497,30 +2587,32 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, * However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing * something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8 */ last_allowed_family = -1; - for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_whitelist); i++) + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (socket_family_allowlist); i++) { - int family = socket_family_whitelist[i].family; + int family = socket_family_allowlist[i].family; int disallowed; - if (socket_family_whitelist[i].flags_mask != 0 && - (socket_family_whitelist[i].flags_mask & run_flags) != socket_family_whitelist[i].flags_mask) + if (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask != 0 && + (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & run_flags) != socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask) continue; for (disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1; disallowed < family; disallowed++) { - /* Blacklist the in-between valid families */ + /* Blocklist the in-between valid families */ seccomp_rule_add_exact (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS (socket), 1, SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed)); } last_allowed_family = family; } - /* Blacklist the rest */ + /* Blocklist the rest */ seccomp_rule_add_exact (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS (socket), 1, SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1)); if (!glnx_open_anonymous_tmpfile (O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, &seccomp_tmpf, error)) return FALSE; - if (seccomp_export_bpf (seccomp, seccomp_tmpf.fd) != 0) - return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to export bpf")); + r = seccomp_export_bpf (seccomp, seccomp_tmpf.fd); + + if (r != 0) + return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to export bpf: %s"), flatpak_seccomp_strerror (r)); lseek (seccomp_tmpf.fd, 0, SEEK_SET); diff -urpN flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h flatpak-1.2.3/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h --- flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 +++ flatpak-1.2.3/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h 2022-08-31 12:51:10.541682037 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2021 Collabora Ltd. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#pragma once + +#include <sys/syscall.h> + +#if defined(_MIPS_SIM) +# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 4000 +# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 5000 +# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 6000 +# else +# error "Unknown MIPS ABI" +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(__ia64__) +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 1024 +#endif + +#if defined(__alpha__) +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 110 +#endif + +#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0x40000000 +#endif + +/* + * FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE: + * + * Number to add to the syscall numbers of recently-added syscalls + * to get the appropriate syscall for the current ABI. + */ +#ifndef FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE +# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_open_tree +# define __NR_open_tree (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 428) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_open_tree +# define __SNR_open_tree __NR_open_tree +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_move_mount +# define __NR_move_mount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 429) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_move_mount +# define __SNR_move_mount __NR_move_mount +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_fsopen +# define __NR_fsopen (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 430) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_fsopen +# define __SNR_fsopen __NR_fsopen +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_fsconfig +# define __NR_fsconfig (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 431) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_fsconfig +# define __SNR_fsconfig __NR_fsconfig +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_fsmount +# define __NR_fsmount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 432) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_fsmount +# define __SNR_fsmount __NR_fsmount +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_fspick +# define __NR_fspick (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 433) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_fspick +# define __SNR_fspick __NR_fspick +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_pidfd_open +# define __NR_pidfd_open (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 434) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_open +# define __SNR_pidfd_open __NR_pidfd_open +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_clone3 +# define __NR_clone3 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 435) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_clone3 +# define __SNR_clone3 __NR_clone3 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_close_range +# define __NR_close_range (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 436) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_close_range +# define __SNR_close_range __NR_close_range +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_openat2 +# define __NR_openat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 437) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_openat2 +# define __SNR_openat2 __NR_openat2 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_pidfd_getfd +# define __NR_pidfd_getfd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 438) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_getfd +# define __SNR_pidfd_getfd __NR_pidfd_getfd +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_faccessat2 +# define __NR_faccessat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 439) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_faccessat2 +# define __SNR_faccessat2 __NR_faccessat2 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_process_madvise +# define __NR_process_madvise (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 440) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_process_madvise +# define __SNR_process_madvise __NR_process_madvise +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_epoll_pwait2 +# define __NR_epoll_pwait2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 441) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_epoll_pwait2 +# define __SNR_epoll_pwait2 __NR_epoll_pwait2 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_mount_setattr +# define __NR_mount_setattr (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 442) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_mount_setattr +# define __SNR_mount_setattr __NR_mount_setattr +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_quotactl_fd +# define __NR_quotactl_fd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 443) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_quotactl_fd +# define __SNR_quotactl_fd __NR_quotactl_fd +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_landlock_create_ruleset +# define __NR_landlock_create_ruleset (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 444) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset +# define __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset __NR_landlock_create_ruleset +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_landlock_add_rule +# define __NR_landlock_add_rule (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 445) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_landlock_add_rule +# define __SNR_landlock_add_rule __NR_landlock_add_rule +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_landlock_restrict_self +# define __NR_landlock_restrict_self (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 446) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_landlock_restrict_self +# define __SNR_landlock_restrict_self __NR_landlock_restrict_self +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_memfd_secret +# define __NR_memfd_secret (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 447) +#endif +#ifndef __SNR_memfd_secret +# define __SNR_memfd_secret __NR_memfd_secret +#endif + +/* Last updated: Linux 5.14, syscall numbers < 448 */ diff -urpN flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/Makefile.am.inc flatpak-1.2.3/common/Makefile.am.inc --- flatpak-1.2.3.orig/common/Makefile.am.inc 2019-02-11 07:44:28.000000000 -0600 +++ flatpak-1.2.3/common/Makefile.am.inc 2022-08-31 12:51:10.541682037 -0500 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ libflatpak_common_la_SOURCES = \ common/flatpak-installation-private.h \ common/flatpak-installation.c \ common/flatpak-instance.c \ + common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h \ common/valgrind-private.h \ $(NULL)
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