File CVE-2022-41859.patch of Package freeradius-server

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File CVE-2022-41859.patch of Package freeradius-server

commit 6f0e0aca4f4e614eea4ce10e226aed73ed4ab68b
Author: Alan T. DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 17 08:37:08 2020 -0400

merge constant time fixes from "master"
    
    Based on a patch from Daniel De Almeida Braga.
    
    The code is now largely the same between master and v3.0.x,
    which makes it easier to see that it's correct

commit d3d3aa67213159f5bca5e72e609f4859e47ddb1b
Author: Alan T. DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 17 08:53:41 2020 -0400

not available in older versions of OpenSSL

commit 1df6f266231816171d2662eacf0e528b8ad1d7d8
Author: Alan T. DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
Date:   Sun Dec 26 12:02:30 2021 -0500

switch to non-deprecated API

commit 9e5e8f2f912ad2da8ac6e176ac3a606333469937
Author: Alan T. DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
Date:   Fri Feb 4 09:36:26 2022 -0500

port fixes from master
    
    via the simple expedient of copying the entire function, with
    some minor changes to work in v3

Index: freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/const_time.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/const_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Helper functions for constant time operations
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ *
+ * These helper functions can be used to implement logic that needs to minimize
+ * externally visible differences in execution path by avoiding use of branches,
+ * avoiding early termination or other time differences, and forcing same memory
+ * access pattern regardless of values.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CONST_TIME_H
+#define CONST_TIME_H
+
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW                                        \
+	__attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * const_time_fill_msb - Fill all bits with MSB value
+ * @param	val Input value
+ * @return	Value with all the bits set to the MSB of the input val
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_fill_msb(unsigned int val)
+{
+	/* Move the MSB to LSB and multiple by -1 to fill in all bits. */
+	return (val >> (sizeof(val) * 8 - 1)) * ~0U;
+}
+
+
+/* @return	-1 if val is zero; 0 if val is not zero */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_is_zero(unsigned int val)
+	NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
+{
+	/* Set MSB to 1 for 0 and fill rest of bits with the MSB value */
+	return const_time_fill_msb(~val & (val - 1));
+}
+
+
+/* @return	-1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+	return const_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+}
+
+
+/* @return	-1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
+static inline unsigned char const_time_eq_u8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+	return (unsigned char) const_time_eq(a, b);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_eq_bin - Constant time memory comparison
+ * @param	a First buffer to compare
+ * @param	b Second buffer to compare
+ * @param	len Number of octets to compare
+ * @return	-1 if buffers are equal, 0 if not
+ *
+ * This function is meant for comparing passwords or hash values where
+ * difference in execution time or memory access pattern could provide external
+ * observer information about the location of the difference in the memory
+ * buffers. The return value does not behave like memcmp(), i.e.,
+ * const_time_eq_bin() cannot be used to sort items into a defined order. Unlike
+ * memcmp(), the execution time of const_time_eq_bin() does not depend on the
+ * contents of the compared memory buffers, but only on the total compared
+ * length.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq_bin(const void *a, const void *b,
+					     size_t len)
+{
+	const unsigned char *aa = a;
+	const unsigned char *bb = b;
+	size_t i;
+	unsigned char res = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		res |= aa[i] ^ bb[i];
+
+	return const_time_is_zero(res);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select - Constant time unsigned int selection
+ * @param	mask 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @param	true_val Value to select for the true case
+ * @param	false_val Value to select for the false case
+ * @return	true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+					     unsigned int true_val,
+					     unsigned int false_val)
+{
+	return (mask & true_val) | (~mask & false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_int - Constant time int selection
+ * @param	mask 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @param	true_val Value to select for the true case
+ * @param	false_val Value to select for the false case
+ * @return	true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline int const_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int true_val,
+					int false_val)
+{
+	return (int) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
+				       (unsigned int) false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_u8 - Constant time u8 selection
+ * @param	mask 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @param	true_val Value to select for the true case
+ * @param	false_val Value to select for the false case
+ * @return	true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline unsigned char const_time_select_u8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char true_val, unsigned char false_val)
+{
+	return (unsigned char) const_time_select(mask, true_val, false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_s8 - Constant time s8 selection
+ * @param	mask 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @param	true_val Value to select for the true case
+ * @param	false_val Value to select for the false case
+ * @return	true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline char const_time_select_s8(char mask, char true_val, char false_val)
+{
+	return (char) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
+				      (unsigned int) false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_bin - Constant time binary buffer selection copy
+ * @param	mask 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to copy
+ * @param	true_val Buffer to copy for the true case
+ * @param	false_val Buffer to copy for the false case
+ * @param	len Number of octets to copy
+ * @param	dst Destination buffer for the copy
+ *
+ * This function copies the specified buffer into the destination buffer using
+ * operations with identical memory access pattern regardless of which buffer
+ * is being copied.
+ */
+static inline void const_time_select_bin(unsigned char mask, const unsigned char *true_val,
+					 const unsigned char *false_val, size_t len,
+					 unsigned char *dst)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		dst[i] = const_time_select_u8(mask, true_val[i], false_val[i]);
+}
+
+
+static inline int const_time_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len)
+{
+	const unsigned char *aa = a;
+	const unsigned char *bb = b;
+	int diff, res = 0;
+	unsigned int mask;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	do {
+		len--;
+		diff = (int) aa[len] - (int) bb[len];
+		mask = const_time_is_zero((unsigned int) diff);
+		res = const_time_select_int(mask, res, diff);
+	} while (len);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONST_TIME_H */
Index: freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
===================================================================
--- freeradius-server-3.0.19.orig/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
+++ freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) Dan Harkins, 2012
- *
- *  Copyright holder grants permission for redistribution and use in source
+/**
+ *  copyright holder grants permission for redistribution and use in source
  *  and binary forms, with or without modification, provided that the
  *  following conditions are met:
  *     1. Redistribution of source code must retain the above copyright
@@ -29,100 +27,236 @@
  * This license and distribution terms cannot be changed. In other words,
  * this code cannot simply be copied and put under a different distribution
  * license (including the GNU public license).
+ *
+ * @copyright (c) Dan Harkins, 2012
  */
 
 RCSID("$Id: 7f91e4b230a15c81b830738924b9d741534fc256 $")
 USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API	/* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */
 
 #include "eap_pwd.h"
+#include "const_time.h"
 
-#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
-#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h>
+static uint8_t allzero[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x00 };
 
 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
-static void H_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+static void pwd_hmac_final(HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, uint8_t *digest)
 {
-	uint8_t allzero[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, digest, &mdlen);
+//	HMAC_CTX_reset(hmac_ctx);
+}
+
+/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
+static void eap_pwd_kdf(uint8_t *key, int keylen, char const *label,
+			int label_len, uint8_t *result, int result_bit_len)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX	*hmac_ctx;
+	uint8_t		digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint16_t	i, ctr, L;
+	int		result_byte_len, len = 0;
+	unsigned int	mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	uint8_t		mask = 0xff;
+
+	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
+	result_byte_len = (result_bit_len + 7) / 8;
+
+	ctr = 0;
+	L = htons(result_bit_len);
+	while (len < result_byte_len) {
+		ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
+
+		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+		if (ctr > 1) HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, digest, mdlen);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(uint16_t));
+		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)label, label_len);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &L, sizeof(uint16_t));
+		HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, digest, &mdlen);
+		if ((len + (int) mdlen) > result_byte_len) {
+			memcpy(result + len, digest, result_byte_len - len);
+		} else {
+			memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
+		}
+		len += mdlen;
+//		HMAC_CTX_reset(hmac_ctx);
+	}
+
+	/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
+	if (result_bit_len % 8) {
+		mask <<= (8 - (result_bit_len % 8));
+		result[result_byte_len - 1] &= mask;
+	}
 
-	memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *consttime_BN (void)
+{
+	BIGNUM *bn;
 
-	HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+	bn = BN_new();
+	if (bn) BN_set_flags(bn, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+	return bn;
 }
 
-static void H_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t const *data, int len)
+/*
+ * compute the legendre symbol in constant time
+ */
+static int legendre(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *bnctx)
 {
-	HMAC_Update(ctx, data, len);
+	int		symbol;
+	unsigned int	mask;
+	BIGNUM		*res, *pm1over2;
+
+	pm1over2 = consttime_BN();
+	res = consttime_BN();
+
+	if (!BN_sub(pm1over2, p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	    !BN_rshift1(pm1over2, pm1over2) ||
+	    !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(res, a, pm1over2, p, bnctx, NULL)) {
+		BN_free(pm1over2);
+		BN_free(res);
+		return -2;
+	}
+
+	symbol = -1;
+	mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_word(res, 1), 1);
+	symbol = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, symbol);
+	mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_zero(res), 1);
+	symbol = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, symbol);
+
+	BN_free(pm1over2);
+	BN_free(res);
+
+	return symbol;
 }
 
-static void H_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *digest)
+static void do_equation(EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *y2, BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *bnctx)
 {
-	unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *tmp1, *pm1;
+
+	tmp1 = BN_new();
+	pm1 = BN_new();
+	p = BN_new();
+	a = BN_new();
+	b = BN_new();
+	EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, p, a, b, bnctx);
 
-	HMAC_Final(ctx, digest, &mdlen);
+	BN_sub(pm1, p, BN_value_one());
+
+	/*
+	 * y2 = x^3 + ax + b
+	 */
+	BN_mod_sqr(tmp1, x, p, bnctx);
+	BN_mod_mul(y2, tmp1, x, p, bnctx);
+	BN_mod_mul(tmp1, a, x, p, bnctx);
+	BN_mod_add_quick(y2, y2, tmp1, p);
+	BN_mod_add_quick(y2, y2, b, p);
+
+	BN_free(tmp1);
+	BN_free(pm1);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+
+	return;
 }
 
-/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
-static int eap_pwd_kdf(uint8_t *key, int keylen, char const *label, int labellen, uint8_t *result, int resultbitlen)
+static int is_quadratic_residue(BIGNUM *val, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *qr, BIGNUM *qnr, BN_CTX *bnctx)
 {
-	HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
-	uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	uint16_t i, ctr, L;
-	int resultbytelen, len = 0;
-	unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-	uint8_t mask = 0xff;
+	int offset, check, ret = 0;
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *pm1 = NULL, *res = NULL, *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
+	unsigned int mask;
+	unsigned char *qr_bin = NULL, *qnr_bin = NULL, *qr_or_qnr_bin = NULL;
 
-	hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-	if (hctx == NULL) {
-		DEBUG("failed allocating HMAC context");
-		return -1;
+	if (((r = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((res = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((qr_or_qnr = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((pm1 = consttime_BN()) == NULL)) {
+		ret = -2;
+		goto fail;
 	}
-	resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7)/8;
-	ctr = 0;
-	L = htons(resultbitlen);
-	while (len < resultbytelen) {
-		ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
-		HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-		if (ctr > 1) {
-			HMAC_Update(hctx, digest, mdlen);
-		}
-		HMAC_Update(hctx, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(uint16_t));
-		HMAC_Update(hctx, (uint8_t const *)label, labellen);
-		HMAC_Update(hctx, (uint8_t *) &L, sizeof(uint16_t));
-		HMAC_Final(hctx, digest, &mdlen);
-		if ((len + (int) mdlen) > resultbytelen) {
-			memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
-		} else {
-			memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
-		}
-		len += mdlen;
+
+	if (((qr_bin = (unsigned char *)malloc(BN_num_bytes(p))) == NULL) ||
+	    ((qnr_bin = (unsigned char *)malloc(BN_num_bytes(p))) == NULL) ||
+	    ((qr_or_qnr_bin = (unsigned char *)malloc(BN_num_bytes(p))) == NULL)) {
+		ret = -2;
+		goto fail;
 	}
-	HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
 
-	/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
-	if (resultbitlen % 8) {
-		mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
-		result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
+	/*
+	 * we select binary in constant time so make them binary
+	 */
+	memset(qr_bin, 0, BN_num_bytes(p));
+	memset(qnr_bin, 0, BN_num_bytes(p));
+	memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, BN_num_bytes(p));
+
+	offset = BN_num_bytes(p) - BN_num_bytes(qr);
+	BN_bn2bin(qr, qr_bin + offset);
+
+	offset = BN_num_bytes(p) - BN_num_bytes(qnr);
+	BN_bn2bin(qnr, qnr_bin + offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * r = (random() mod p-1) + 1
+	 */
+	BN_sub(pm1, p, BN_value_one());
+	BN_rand_range(r, pm1);
+	BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one());
+
+	BN_copy(res, val);
+
+	/*
+	 * res = val * r * r which ensures res != val but has same quadratic residocity
+	 */
+	BN_mod_mul(res, res, r, p, bnctx);
+	BN_mod_mul(res, res, r, p, bnctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * if r is even (mask is -1) then multiply by qnr and our check is qnr
+	 * otherwise multiply by qr and our check is qr
+	 */
+	mask = const_time_is_zero(BN_is_odd(r));
+	const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr_bin, qr_bin, BN_num_bytes(p), qr_or_qnr_bin);
+	BN_bin2bn(qr_or_qnr_bin, BN_num_bytes(p), qr_or_qnr);
+	BN_mod_mul(res, res, qr_or_qnr, p, bnctx);
+	check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1);
+
+	if ((ret = legendre(res, p, bnctx)) == -2) {
+		ret = -1;	/* just say no it's not */
+		goto fail;
 	}
+	mask = const_time_eq(ret, check);
+	ret = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0);
 
-	return 0;
+fail:
+	if (qr_bin != NULL) free(qr_bin);
+	if (qnr_bin != NULL) free(qnr_bin);
+	if (qr_or_qnr_bin != NULL) free(qr_or_qnr_bin);
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(res);
+	BN_free(qr_or_qnr);
+	BN_free(pm1);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
-int compute_password_element (pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
+int compute_password_element (REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
 			      char const *password, int password_len,
 			      char const *id_server, int id_server_len,
 			      char const *id_peer, int id_peer_len,
 			      uint32_t *token)
 {
-	BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-	HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-	uint8_t pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
-	int nid, is_odd, primebitlen, primebytelen, ret = 0;
-
-	ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-	if (ctx == NULL) {
-		DEBUG("failed allocating HMAC context");
-		goto fail;
-	}
+	BIGNUM		*x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *y_sqrd = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *y1 = NULL, *y2 = NULL, *y = NULL, *exp = NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX	*hmac_ctx;
+	EVP_PKEY	*hmac_pkey;
+	uint8_t		pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prfbuf = NULL, *xbuf = NULL, *pm1buf = NULL, *y1buf = NULL, *y2buf = NULL, *ybuf = NULL, ctr;
+	int		nid, is_odd, primebitlen, primebytelen, ret = 0, found = 0, mask;
+	int		save, i, rbits, qr_or_qnr, save_is_odd = 0, cmp;
+	unsigned int	skip;
+
+	MEM(hmac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new());
+	MEM(hmac_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, allzero, sizeof(allzero)));
 
 	switch (grp_num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
 	case 19:
@@ -159,17 +293,23 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_sessio
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+	if (((rnd = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
 	    ((session->pwe = EC_POINT_new(session->group)) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->order = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->prime = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((x_candidate = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+	    ((session->order = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((session->prime = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((qr = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((qnr = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((x_candidate = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((y_sqrd = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((y1 = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((y2 = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+	    ((y = consttime_BN()) == NULL) ||
+        ((exp = consttime_BN()) == NULL)) {
 		DEBUG("unable to create bignums");
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(session->group, session->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+	if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve(session->group, session->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
 		DEBUG("unable to get prime for GFp curve");
 		goto fail;
 	}
@@ -179,46 +319,80 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_sessio
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(session->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
-		DEBUG("unable to get cofactor for curve");
-		goto fail;
-	}
-
 	primebitlen = BN_num_bits(session->prime);
 	primebytelen = BN_num_bytes(session->prime);
 	if ((prfbuf = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
 		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for prf buffer");
 		goto fail;
 	}
+	if ((xbuf = talloc_zero_array(request, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for x buffer");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((pm1buf = talloc_zero_array(request, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for pm1 buffer");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((y1buf = talloc_zero_array(request, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for y1 buffer");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((y2buf = talloc_zero_array(request, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for y2 buffer");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ybuf = talloc_zero_array(request, uint8_t, primebytelen)) == NULL) {
+		DEBUG("unable to alloc space for y buffer");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	* derive random quadradic residue and quadratic non-residue
+	*/
+	do {
+		BN_rand_range(qr, session->prime);
+	} while (legendre(qr, session->prime, session->bnctx) != 1);
+
+	do {
+		BN_rand_range(qnr, session->prime);
+	} while (legendre(qnr, session->prime, session->bnctx) != -1);
+
+	if (!BN_sub(rnd, session->prime, BN_value_one())) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	BN_bn2bin(rnd, pm1buf);
+
+	save_is_odd = 0;
+	found = 0;
+	memset(xbuf, 0, primebytelen);
 	ctr = 0;
-	while (1) {
-		if (ctr > 100) {
-			DEBUG("unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy", grp_num);
-			goto fail;
-		}
+	while (ctr < 40) {
 		ctr++;
 
 		/*
 		 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
-		 *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
-		 *		   counter)
+		 *	pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
+		 *		     counter)
 		 */
-		H_Init(ctx);
-		H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
-		H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
-		H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
-		H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
-		H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
-		H_Final(ctx, pwe_digest);
+		EVP_DigestSignInit(hmac_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, hmac_pkey);
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
 
-		BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
-		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
-			        strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"), prfbuf, primebitlen) != 0) {
-			DEBUG("key derivation function failed");
-			goto fail;
+		{
+			size_t mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+			EVP_DigestSignFinal(hmac_ctx, pwe_digest, &mdlen);
+			EVP_MD_CTX_reset(hmac_ctx);
 		}
 
-		BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
+		BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
+		eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
+			    strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"), prfbuf, primebitlen);
+
 		/*
 		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
 		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
@@ -226,49 +400,86 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_sessio
 		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
 		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
 		 */
-		if (primebitlen % 8) BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate, (8 - (primebitlen % 8)));
-		if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, session->prime) >= 0) continue;
+		if (primebitlen % 8) {
+			rbits = 8 - (primebitlen % 8);
+			for (i = primebytelen - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+				prfbuf[i] = (prfbuf[i - 1] << (8 - rbits)) | (prfbuf[i] >> rbits);
+			}
+			prfbuf[0] >>= rbits;
+		}
+		BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
 
 		/*
-		 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
-		 * one...
-		 */
-		is_odd = BN_is_odd(rnd) ? 1 : 0;
+		* it would've been better if the spec reduced the candidate
+		* modulo the prime but it didn't. So if the candidate >= prime
+		* we need to skip it but still run through the operations below
+		*/
+		cmp = const_time_memcmp(pm1buf, prfbuf, primebytelen);
+		skip = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int)cmp);
 
 		/*
-		 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
-		 * don't have a point
-		 */
-		if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->pwe, x_candidate, is_odd, NULL)) {
-			continue;
-		}
+		* need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
+		* one..
+		*/
+		is_odd = BN_is_odd(rnd);
 
 		/*
-		 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
-		 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
-		 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
-		 * hurt just to be sure.
-		 */
-		if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->pwe, NULL)) {
-			DEBUG("EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
-			continue;
-		}
+		* check whether x^3 + a*x + b is a quadratic residue
+		*
+		* save the first quadratic residue we find in the loop but do
+		* it in constant time.
+		*/
+		do_equation(session->group, y_sqrd, x_candidate, session->bnctx);
+		qr_or_qnr = is_quadratic_residue(y_sqrd, session->prime, qr, qnr, session->bnctx);
 
-		if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
-			/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
-			if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, session->pwe, NULL, session->pwe,
-				cofactor, NULL)) {
-				DEBUG("EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
-				continue;
-			}
+		/*
+		* if the candidate >= prime then we want to skip it
+		*/
+		qr_or_qnr = const_time_select(skip, 0, qr_or_qnr);
 
-			if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->pwe)) {
-				DEBUG("EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
-				continue;
-			}
-		}
-		/* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
-		break;
+		/*
+		* if we haven't found PWE yet (found = 0) then mask will be true,
+		* if we have found PWE then mask will be false
+		*/
+		mask = const_time_select(found, 0, -1);
+
+		/*
+		* save will be 1 if we want to save this value-- i.e. we haven't
+		* found PWE yet and this is a quadratic residue-- and 0 otherwise
+		*/
+		save = const_time_select(mask, qr_or_qnr, 0);
+
+		/*
+		* mask will be true (-1) if we want to save this and false (0)
+		* otherwise
+		*/
+		mask = const_time_eq(save, 1);
+
+		const_time_select_bin(mask, prfbuf, xbuf, primebytelen, xbuf);
+		save_is_odd = const_time_select(mask, is_odd, save_is_odd);
+		found = const_time_select(mask, -1, found);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	* now we can savely construct PWE
+	*/
+	BN_bin2bn(xbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
+	do_equation(session->group, y_sqrd, x_candidate, session->bnctx);
+	if ( !BN_add(exp, session->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
+		 !BN_rshift(exp, exp, 2) ||
+		 !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(y1, y_sqrd, exp, session->prime, session->bnctx, NULL) ||
+		 !BN_sub(y2, session->prime, y1) ||
+		 !BN_bn2bin(y1, y1buf) ||
+		 !BN_bn2bin(y2, y2buf)) {
+		DEBUG("unable to compute y");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	mask = const_time_eq(save_is_odd, BN_is_odd(y1));
+	const_time_select_bin(mask, y1buf, y2buf, primebytelen, ybuf);
+	if (BN_bin2bn(ybuf, primebytelen, y) == NULL ||
+		!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->pwe, x_candidate, y, session->bnctx)) {
+		DEBUG("unable to set point coordinate");
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	session->group_num = grp_num;
@@ -278,78 +489,89 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_sessio
 	}
 
 	/* cleanliness and order.... */
-	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
 	BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
+	BN_clear_free(y_sqrd);
+	BN_clear_free(qr);
+	BN_clear_free(qnr);
 	BN_clear_free(rnd);
-	talloc_free(prfbuf);
-	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+	BN_clear_free(y1);
+	BN_clear_free(y2);
+	BN_clear_free(y);
+	BN_clear_free(exp);
+
+	if (prfbuf) talloc_free(prfbuf);
+	if (xbuf) talloc_free(xbuf);
+	if (pm1buf) talloc_free(pm1buf);
+	if (y1buf) talloc_free(y1buf);
+	if (y2buf) talloc_free(y2buf);
+	if (ybuf) talloc_free(ybuf);
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(hmac_pkey);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int compute_scalar_element (pwd_session_t *session, BN_CTX *bnctx) {
+int compute_scalar_element(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
+{
 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL;
 	int ret = -1;
 
-	if (((session->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->my_element = EC_POINT_new(session->group)) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->my_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((mask = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
-		DEBUG2("server scalar allocation failed");
-		goto fail;
-	}
+	MEM(session->private_value = BN_new());
+	MEM(session->my_element = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
+	MEM(session->my_scalar = BN_new());
+
+	MEM(mask = BN_new());
 
 	if (BN_rand_range(session->private_value, session->order) != 1) {
-		DEBUG2("Unable to get randomness for private_value");
-		goto fail;
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get randomness for private_value");
+		goto error;
 	}
 	if (BN_rand_range(mask, session->order) != 1) {
-		DEBUG2("Unable to get randomness for mask");
-		goto fail;
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get randomness for mask");
+		goto error;
 	}
 	BN_add(session->my_scalar, session->private_value, mask);
-	BN_mod(session->my_scalar, session->my_scalar, session->order, bnctx);
+	BN_mod(session->my_scalar, session->my_scalar, session->order, bn_ctx);
 
-	if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, session->my_element, NULL, session->pwe, mask, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("server element allocation failed");
-		goto fail;
+	if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, session->my_element, NULL, session->pwe, mask, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Server element allocation failed");
+		goto error;
 	}
 
-	if (!EC_POINT_invert(session->group, session->my_element, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("server element inversion failed");
-		goto fail;
+	if (!EC_POINT_invert(session->group, session->my_element, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Server element inversion failed");
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	ret = 0;
 
-fail:
+error:
 	BN_clear_free(mask);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, BN_CTX *bnctx)
+int process_peer_commit(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
 {
-	uint8_t *ptr;
-	size_t data_len;
-	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
-	int res = 1;
-
-	if (((session->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((y = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-	    ((point = EC_POINT_new(session->group)) == NULL) ||
-	    ((K = EC_POINT_new(session->group)) == NULL) ||
-	    ((session->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(session->group)) == NULL)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: failed to allocate room to process peer's commit");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	uint8_t		*ptr;
+	size_t		data_len;
+	BIGNUM		*x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+	EC_POINT	*K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+	int		ret = 1;
+
+	MEM(session->peer_scalar = BN_new());
+	MEM(session->k = BN_new());
+	MEM(session->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
+	MEM(point = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
+	MEM(K = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
+
+	MEM(cofactor = BN_new());
+	MEM(x = BN_new());
+	MEM(y = BN_new());
 
 	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(session->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get group co-factor");
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get group co-factor");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
@@ -361,7 +583,7 @@ int process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *
 	 *	Did the peer send enough data?
 	 */
 	if (in_len < (2 * data_len + BN_num_bytes(session->order))) {
-		DEBUG("pwd: Invalid commit packet");
+		REDEBUG("Invalid commit packet");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
@@ -377,54 +599,54 @@ int process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *
 	if (BN_is_zero(session->peer_scalar) ||
 	    BN_is_one(session->peer_scalar) ||
 	    BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->order) >= 0) {
-		ERROR("Peer's scalar is not within the allowed range");
+		REDEBUG("Peer's scalar is not within the allowed range");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
-	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	/* validate received element */
-	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->peer_element, bnctx) ||
+	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->peer_element, bn_ctx) ||
 	    EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->peer_element)) {
-		ERROR("Peer's element is not a point on the elliptic curve");
+		REDEBUG("Peer's element is not a point on the elliptic curve");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
 	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, point, NULL, session->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
-			DEBUG2("pwd: unable to multiply element by co-factor");
+			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply element by co-factor");
 			goto finish;
 		}
 
 		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, point)) {
-			DEBUG2("pwd: peer's element is in small sub-group");
+			REDEBUG("Peer's element is in small sub-group");
 			goto finish;
 		}
 	}
 
 	/* detect reflection attacks */
 	if (BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->my_scalar) == 0 ||
-	    EC_POINT_cmp(session->group, session->peer_element, session->my_element, bnctx) == 0) {
-		ERROR("Reflection attack detected");
+	    EC_POINT_cmp(session->group, session->peer_element, session->my_element, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+		REDEBUG("Reflection attack detected");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	/* compute the shared key, k */
-	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, session->pwe, session->peer_scalar, bnctx)) ||
-	    (!EC_POINT_add(session->group, K, K, session->peer_element, bnctx)) ||
-	    (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, session->private_value, bnctx))) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to compute shared key, k");
+	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, session->pwe, session->peer_scalar, bn_ctx)) ||
+	    (!EC_POINT_add(session->group, K, K, session->peer_element, bn_ctx)) ||
+	    (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, session->private_value, bn_ctx))) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to compute shared key, k");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	/* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
 	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor, NULL)) {
-			DEBUG2("pwd: unable to multiply k by co-factor");
+			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply k by co-factor");
 			goto finish;
 		}
 	}
@@ -436,15 +658,15 @@ int process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *
 	 * sure" so let's be safe.
 	 */
 	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, K)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: k is point-at-infinity!");
+		REDEBUG("K is point-at-infinity");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, K, session->k, NULL, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get shared secret from K");
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(session->group, K, session->k, NULL, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get shared secret from K");
 		goto finish;
 	}
-	res = 0;
+	ret = 0;
 
 finish:
 	EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
@@ -453,36 +675,29 @@ finish:
 	BN_clear_free(x);
 	BN_clear_free(y);
 
-	return res;
+	return ret;
 }
 
-int compute_server_confirm (pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx)
+int compute_server_confirm(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
 {
-	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
-	HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-	uint8_t *cruft = NULL;
-	int offset, req = -1;
-
-	ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-	if (ctx == NULL) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate HMAC context!");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	BIGNUM		*x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+	HMAC_CTX	*hmac_ctx = NULL;
+	uint8_t		*cruft = NULL;
+	int		offset, req = -1;
 
 	/*
 	 * Each component of the cruft will be at most as big as the prime
 	 */
-	if (((cruft = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime))) == NULL) ||
-	    ((x = BN_new()) == NULL) || ((y = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate space to compute confirm!");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	MEM(cruft = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime)));
+	MEM(x = BN_new());
+	MEM(y = BN_new());
 
 	/*
 	 * commit is H(k | server_element | server_scalar | peer_element |
 	 *	       peer_scalar | ciphersuite)
 	 */
-	H_Init(ctx);
+	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
 
 	/*
 	 * Zero the memory each time because this is mod prime math and some
@@ -492,24 +707,24 @@ int compute_server_confirm (pwd_session_
 	 */
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(session->k);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->k, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	 * next is server element: x, y
 	 */
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->my_element, x, y, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of server element");
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->my_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of server element");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	 * and server scalar
@@ -517,25 +732,25 @@ int compute_server_confirm (pwd_session_
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->my_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
 
 	/*
 	 * next is peer element: x, y
 	 */
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	 * and peer scalar
@@ -543,52 +758,46 @@ int compute_server_confirm (pwd_session_
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->peer_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
 
 	/*
 	 * finally, ciphersuite
 	 */
-	H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
 
-	H_Final(ctx, out);
+	pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, out);
 
 	req = 0;
+
 finish:
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
 	talloc_free(cruft);
 	BN_free(x);
 	BN_free(y);
-	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
 
 	return req;
 }
 
-int compute_peer_confirm (pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx)
+int compute_peer_confirm(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
 {
-	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
-	HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-	uint8_t *cruft = NULL;
-	int offset, req = -1;
-
-	ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-	if (ctx == NULL) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate HMAC context!");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	BIGNUM		*x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+	HMAC_CTX	*hmac_ctx = NULL;
+	uint8_t		*cruft = NULL;
+	int		offset, req = -1;
 
 	/*
 	 * Each component of the cruft will be at most as big as the prime
 	 */
-	if (((cruft = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime))) == NULL) ||
-	    ((x = BN_new()) == NULL) || ((y = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate space to compute confirm!");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	MEM(cruft = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime)));
+	MEM(x = BN_new());
+	MEM(y = BN_new());
 
 	/*
 	 * commit is H(k | server_element | server_scalar | peer_element |
 	 *	       peer_scalar | ciphersuite)
 	 */
-	H_Init(ctx);
+	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
 
 	/*
 	 * Zero the memory each time because this is mod prime math and some
@@ -598,25 +807,25 @@ int compute_peer_confirm (pwd_session_t
 	 */
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(session->k);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->k, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	* then peer element: x, y
 	*/
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	 * and peer scalar
@@ -624,24 +833,24 @@ int compute_peer_confirm (pwd_session_t
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->peer_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
 
 	/*
 	 * then server element: x, y
 	 */
-	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->my_element, x, y, bnctx)) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of server element");
+	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(session->group, session->my_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
+		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of server element");
 		goto finish;
 	}
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
 	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
 	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
 	/*
 	 * and server scalar
@@ -649,94 +858,75 @@ int compute_peer_confirm (pwd_session_t
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->my_scalar);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
 
 	/*
 	 * finally, ciphersuite
 	 */
-	H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
 
-	H_Final(ctx, out);
+	pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, out);
 
 	req = 0;
 finish:
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
 	talloc_free(cruft);
 	BN_free(x);
 	BN_free(y);
-	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
 
 	return req;
 }
 
-int compute_keys (pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *peer_confirm, uint8_t *msk, uint8_t *emsk)
+int compute_keys(UNUSED REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *peer_confirm, uint8_t *msk, uint8_t *emsk)
 {
-	HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-	uint8_t mk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft = NULL;
-	uint8_t session_id[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1];
-	uint8_t msk_emsk[128];		/* 64 each */
-	int offset, ret = -1;
+	HMAC_CTX	*hmac_ctx;
+	uint8_t		mk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft;
+	uint8_t		session_id[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1];
+	uint8_t		msk_emsk[128];		/* 64 each */
+	int	 	offset;
 
-	ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
-	if (ctx == NULL) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate HMAC context!");
-		goto finish;
-	}
-
-	if ((cruft = talloc_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime))) == NULL) {
-		DEBUG2("pwd: unable to allocate space to compute keys");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	MEM(cruft = talloc_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime)));
+	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
 
 	/*
 	 * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
 	 *	scal_s)
 	 */
 	session_id[0] = PW_EAP_PWD;
-	H_Init(ctx);
-	H_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->peer_scalar);
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	BN_bn2bin(session->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->my_scalar);
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	BN_bn2bin(session->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
-	H_Final(ctx, (uint8_t *)&session_id[1]);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
+	pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session_id[1]);
 
 	/* then compute MK = H(k | commit-peer | commit-server) */
-	H_Init(ctx);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
 
 	memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 	offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(session->k);
 	BN_bn2bin(session->k, cruft + offset);
-	H_Update(ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
 
-	H_Update(ctx, peer_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, peer_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 
-	H_Update(ctx, session->my_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, session->my_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 
-	H_Final(ctx, mk);
+	pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, mk);
 
 	/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
-	if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, (char const *)session_id,
-		        SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1, msk_emsk,
-			/* it's bits, ((64 + 64) * 8) */
-			1024) != 0) {
-		DEBUG("key derivation function failed");
-		goto finish;
-	}
+	eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, (char const *)session_id,
+		    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1, msk_emsk, 1024);  /* it's bits, ((64 + 64) * 8) */
 
 	memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, 64);
 	memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + 64, 64);
 
-	ret = 0;
-finish:
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
 	talloc_free(cruft);
-	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
-
-
-
-
Index: freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.h
===================================================================
--- freeradius-server-3.0.19.orig/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.h
+++ freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.h
@@ -104,16 +104,16 @@ typedef struct _pwd_session_t {
     uint8_t my_confirm[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 } pwd_session_t;
 
-int compute_password_element(pwd_session_t *sess, uint16_t grp_num,
+int compute_password_element(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, uint16_t grp_num,
 			     char const *password, int password_len,
 			     char const *id_server, int id_server_len,
 			     char const *id_peer, int id_peer_len,
 			     uint32_t *token);
-int compute_scalar_element(pwd_session_t *sess, BN_CTX *bnctx);
-int process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, BN_CTX *bnctx);
-int compute_server_confirm(pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx);
-int compute_peer_confirm(pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx);
-int compute_keys(pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *peer_confirm,
+int compute_scalar_element(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, BN_CTX *bnctx);
+int process_peer_commit(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, BN_CTX *bnctx);
+int compute_server_confirm(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx);
+int compute_peer_confirm(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bnctx);
+int compute_keys(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *peer_confirm,
 		 uint8_t *msk, uint8_t *emsk);
 #ifdef PRINTBUF
 void print_buf(char *str, uint8_t *buf, int len);
Index: freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/rlm_eap_pwd.c
===================================================================
--- freeradius-server-3.0.19.orig/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/rlm_eap_pwd.c
+++ freeradius-server-3.0.19/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/rlm_eap_pwd.c
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		if (compute_password_element(session, session->group_num,
+		if (compute_password_element(request, session, session->group_num,
 			     		     pw->data.strvalue, strlen(pw->data.strvalue),
 					     inst->server_id, strlen(inst->server_id),
 					     session->peer_id, strlen(session->peer_id),
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 		/*
 		 * compute our scalar and element
 		 */
-		if (compute_scalar_element(session, session->bnctx)) {
+		if (compute_scalar_element(request, session, session->bnctx)) {
 			DEBUG2("failed to compute server's scalar and element");
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 		/*
 		 * process the peer's commit and generate the shared key, k
 		 */
-		if (process_peer_commit(session, in, in_len, session->bnctx)) {
+		if (process_peer_commit(request, session, in, in_len, session->bnctx)) {
 			RDEBUG2("failed to process peer's commit");
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 		/*
 		 * compute our confirm blob
 		 */
-		if (compute_server_confirm(session, session->my_confirm, session->bnctx)) {
+		if (compute_server_confirm(request, session, session->my_confirm, session->bnctx)) {
 			ERROR("rlm_eap_pwd: failed to compute confirm!");
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 			RDEBUG2("pwd exchange is incorrect: not commit!");
 			return 0;
 		}
-		if (compute_peer_confirm(session, peer_confirm, session->bnctx)) {
+		if (compute_peer_confirm(request, session, peer_confirm, session->bnctx)) {
 			RDEBUG2("pwd exchange cannot compute peer's confirm");
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int mod_process(void *arg, eap_ha
 			RDEBUG2("pwd exchange fails: peer confirm is incorrect!");
 			return 0;
 		}
-		if (compute_keys(session, peer_confirm, msk, emsk)) {
+		if (compute_keys(request, session, peer_confirm, msk, emsk)) {
 			RDEBUG2("pwd exchange cannot generate (E)MSK!");
 			return 0;
 		}

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File CVE-2022-41859.patch of Package freeradius-server

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